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Abstract
Computers and routers on the Internet send each other error mes-
sages (called ICMP datagrams) to signal conditions such as network
congestion or blackouts. While these datagrams are very rare, less than
0.001% of total traffic, they hold very important global information about
problems and congestions elsewhere in the Net. A measurement of the
flow of such error messages in our local cluster shows a very pathological
distribution of inter-message times: P (∆t) ≈ 1/∆t. This scaling extends
for about seven decades, and is only punctuated by extraneously periodic
signals from automatons. More than a half of these error messages were
themselves generated erroneously.
The decentralized and anarchich structure of the Internet has, for a long
time, invited people to perform all sorts of measurements. Indeed, it has taxed
and even challenged our ability to make such measurements: for instance, it’s
been several years since we last knew, to any accuracy, how large the Inter-
net actually is [1, 2]. Many types of measurements have shown “anomalous”
or “pathologic” statistics, meaning that the distribution of some quantity has
power-law (a.k.a. Pareto or “heavy”) tails . A power-law tail implies that the
probability of an outlier diminishes very slowly with the size of the outlier,
and hence measurements show strong irregularities. While anomalous from a
classical statistics viewpoint, this is a very usual phenomenon in the natural
sciences, and has been extensively studied [3, 4]; in particular, one of the earli-
est examples concerns noise in communication channels [5]. As applied to the
Internet, local traffic measurements at the datagram level [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], session
data [11], webserver workloads [12, 13], USENET thread length [14] and Web
surfing patterns [15] all show these tails. There is ample evidence that these
statistical pathologies do not come from intrinsic instabilities of the Net as a
communications system, but rather stem from the way in which people use the
Net. Power-law distributions are often regarded as prima-facie evidence of some
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self-organizational process, but they can also simply be a reflection of other
underlying power laws. The sizes of all files on a computer follow a power-law
distribution, from small files a few characters in size, to large datasets (e.g.,
videos) hundreds of megabytes in size. It is thus natural that, for instance,
the sizes of documents retrieved from webservers reflect this underlying breadth
[13], and it’s also been shown that individual surfers follow anomalous Levy-
flight-like surfing patterns [15]. A useful and clarifying distinction was made in
[11]: the initiations of “sessions” (such as telnet or ftp) follow perfectly normal
Poissonian patterns, while the individual transactions within a session (the ft-
pdata connections, or the TCP traffic within a given telnet session) fluctuate
over many scales.
However, all such measurements of local “traffic” have built-in limitations as
to how much they can fluctuate. Indeed examination of the data shows a fairly
complicated picture: the bulk of the traffic is not “self-similar” or pathological;
only some tails show power-law scaling over a limited range. See Figure 1. Even
a moderate amount of scaling behaviour can certainly create a lot of trouble
for engineers (who have to design equipment to handle such contingencies);
but it is not pervasive enough, nor is it defined over a large enough range, to
qualify as “self-similar” behaviour in the sense in which it is usually used in the
natural sciences. We could say that we are trying to make a measurement of
precipitation during a storm: it will probably fluctuate and be gutsy, but in its
bulk be statistically regular.
We will do something different here: we will not focus on what we can mea-
sure on a storm locally, but rather try to listen for echos of storms elsewhere. We
will do so by focusing on a negligible portion of the local traffic: the ICMP error
messages. These are packets that computers or routers send to each other on
the internet to signal all sorts of traffic problems: “speak slower, you’re breaking
up” or “you can’t get there from here” or “this bridge is backed up”, etc. ICMP
error messages are generated only when packets are “dropped”, i.e., typically
during congestions or blackouts, or simply to signal that a certain “place” does
not exist and hence you can’t get there. They are, thus, an indication of a
deluge elsewhere, the locally received sound of faraway storms [16].
We measure ICMP error datagrams exchanged between our cluster and the
outside of Rockefeller University. Error messages are rather rare, and hence
it takes a very long time to accumulate a reasonable amount of events: our
measurement accumulated 11118 datagrams in a span of 29 days. A histogram of
packet inter-arrival times (∆ti = ti+1 − ti) shows a distribution P (∆t) ≈ 1/∆t;
the scaling holds for about 7 decades, from 0.3 milliseconds to an hour: see
Figure 2. It is only punctuated by what appear as “Dirac deltas”: bursts with
high periodicity embedded within the stream of error messages. These bursts
typically correspond to “repeat transmissions” of the same error message. The
distribution is much broader than traffic measurements, as shown in Table 1.
The periodics peaks observed also show, on detailed inspection, some intrigu-
ing features. The peaks are listed in Table 2. Several peaks are exceedingly thin;
for instance, the 64 seconds peak has a half-width of 1 millisecond. However,
most of the events in this peak were generated by a router immediately outside
2
Table 1: Distribution Widths.
Where What 25% 75% Width Figure
R.U. Full Traffic 1.170 3.154 2.70 1a
BellCore Full Traffic 1.108 3.760 3.39 1b
R.U. External Traffic 44.891 261.276 5.82 1c
BellCore External Traffic 2.524 22.372 8.86 1d
R.U. ICMP Errors, ext 239.511 32000 133.6 2a
We define the width of a distribution as the quotient between the 75% percentile
and the 25% percentile: it thus indicates the range within which the middle
half of the probability is contained. The value for a Poisson point process is
log(1/4)/ log(3/4) = 4.82, and the value for a Pareto distribution (G(x) = 1 −
(ax )
b) is 31/b. The width is not translation invariant (as the standard deviation),
but it is scale invariant; unlike the standard deviation, it is always defined.
Times for the percentiles in milliseconds.
Table 2: Peaks
∆t (sec) ± h.w. # → R L DU Comments
0.240 0.001 87 out 3 5 port RealAudio timeouts
0.500 0.010 79 in 40 8 host Nearby Router
1.000 0.010 51 in 34 8
1.500 0.010 103 out 86 8 port
2.000 0.002 68 in 13 5 port
(5.5 → 6.0) 977 in 336 16 All Heterogeneous
24.000 0.001 84 in 50 4 far routers
32.000 0.002 12 out 1 1 port frgn DNS timeout
64.000 0.001 27 in 1 3 host nearby router.
75.000 0.003 22 in 14 2 host far routers
the “walls” of Rockefeller, just three hops away, which explains the timing ac-
curacy. Not all peaks are that easily explained. The 24 seconds peak also has
a half-width of 1 millisecond; the 84 events within the half-width were gener-
ated by 48 different routers and leaf nodes; most of them are in excess of 18
hops away, with latencies about 500ms, and some of them are as far away as
Germany, France and England; 19 of them were not on the DNS name tables.
It is interesting to note that P (t) ≈ 1/t is a highly anomalous scaling, a
limiting case of Pareto distributions. Not only does it lack standard deviation
and mean, it is not even normalizable in the absence of both short time and
long time cutoffs. In fact, it is the only power law which shows a symmetry
under exchange of short and long times: both are equally divergent. Using the
transformation ν = 1/t and P (t)dt = P (ν)dν, we get P (ν) = 1/ν because dν =
dt/t2, so our measurement shows a discrete point process version of 1/f noise.
Thus, the distribution of times between consecutive error messages displays a
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behaviour which has no free parameters at all, except for the cutoffs. No features
or details of the engineering underneath are left in this background, no traces
of any of the many protocols.
Recently, Huberman and Lukose [17] analysed the issue of global jamming
on the internet. They were able to show that a simple game of cooperation
and defection by Internet users would cause global jams, even when they used
a trivial network transport model and a very simplified model of individual
activity. The jams, though, have a nonpathological waiting time distribution,
perhaps because the transport model used ignored the highly structured, tree-
like connectivity of the Internet. This connectivity structure can be shown
to provide a bias towards 1/t behaviour in the kind of measurement reported
here. As seen from a given computer (a “leaf node”), the jumble of routers
connecting to the rest of the Internet looks pretty much like a tree, though
there are a few cycles due to the return paths from routers and multiple routes
to a given destination. This tree changes with time, as the structure of routing
changes; but at any given time, it still looks pretty much like a tree. Counting
how many routers are exactly n hops away from us, we observe the number to
roughly double each hop [21], so modeling the net as a binary tree, while a gross
oversimplification, is nevertheless somewhat metrically correct; the real tree has
hugely varying connectivity. If a link goes down for whatever reasons, it will
take a while until nearby routers learn how to route around it. An attempt to
access a host routed through this link will result in a “Destination unreachable”
error message. Assuming a nonpathological distribution (links go down and
up as uncorrelated processes with identical probabilities per link), attempts to
randomly access the leaves generates a 1/t distribution of waiting times between
error messages, see simulation output on Figure 3.
This model is, however, not enough to explain our data. Though the basic
power law is the same, the cutoffs strongly disagree. The extent of the scaling
region is determined by the number of levels in the tree; in order to fit this
extent to our data, the Internet should have several billion nodes. The lowest
cutoff is given by the frequency at which the root node attempts to access
leaves; in order to match our lower cutoff of < 1 ms, our domain would have
to be attempting to access thousands of different computers per second, which
is orders of magnitude wrong. The model should thus not be understood as an
explanation of 1/t behaviour in our data, but rather as a basic structural bias
towards power-law behaviour that the geometry imposes on the system.
In a classic study, S. Bellovin [23] described a “natural computer virus”: a
DNS cache-corruption virus. Hosts on the Internet rely upon DNS name servers
to get the address of a computer based on its name, and viceversa; DNS servers
communicate with one another to get this information. In addition, DNS servers
will ”cache” the names they’ve obtained from other nameservers for a while.
If this cache or a portion thereof is corrupted, then the DNS server will serve
incorrect addresses, not just to hosts, but to other DNS servers, thus propagating
the errors. It is highly likely that DNS is not the only Internet service that
can support such self-propagating entities; there might indeed be a veritable
ecosystem evolving on the backwaters of the net. Interestingly, evolutionary
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Table 3: Breakout by Protocol
Packets Type Code [20]
1 3 Dest unreachable 2 Bad protocol
4 11 Time exceeded 1 in reassembly
18 3 Dest unreachable 10 Forbidden host
21 3 Dest unreachable 4 Needed to fragment
21 3 Dest unreachable 9 Forbidden net
23 3 Dest unreachable 0 Bad net
86 5 Redirect 0 network
256 5 Redirect 1 host
983 4 Source Quench Incorrect1
1665 11 Time exceeded 0 in transit
2206 3 Dest unreachable 3 Bad port
2497 3 Dest unreachable 1 Bad host
3300 3 Dest unreachable 13 Communication
administratively forbidden
1 RFC1812 [19] stipulates that Source Quench messages should not be sent.
pressure on such potential beings would be to stay out of sight, since their being
noticed would result in fixing of the software bug that allows them to propagate
in the first place. The generic feature enabling such a state of confusion to
propagate is the fact that a master server cannot determine that it is confused,
and can’t reply ”I am or might be confused, ask someone else”. Thus the server
keeps speweing confusion. Quite a few services have such structure.
As applied to our case, we have been measuring errors, and most of them are
generated by routers, and routers pass to one another information that is deemed
to be authoritative through RIP. So it would be interesting to assess whether
the ICMP errors are correctly generated or are, themselves, erroneous. Table 3
shows a breakout by protocol of our data set. A fair fraction of the errors seen
there should not have been sent at all; source quench datagrams, for instance,
have been deprecated for a long time. The redirect messages should not have
made it out of their respective local net, and the redirect host class consists
exclusively of messages like “to reach host x, use x as a gateway”, which are
obviously nonsensical [23]. Time exceeded in transit are typically generating
through erroneous routing loops [24]. But the most frequent class of errors,
Destination unreachable, poses an interesting problem: since these problems
are typically transient, how can one evaluate whether the datagrams were sent
correctly or in error? A way out is to notice that the most frequent subclass
of errors is communication administratively forbidden. This should mean the
host is in a protected subnet, typically behind a firewall, a condition which is
definitely not transient. We generated a list [22] of all the hosts to which an
access attempt had resulted in this error in our dataset, and attempted access
all over again. We got through without errors to 152 hosts out of 320 (≈ 50%),
which means that these hosts were not placed behind administrative restrictions.
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These hosts were responsible for 2297 error datagrams out of the 3300 (≈ 70%).
Thus we can say that, in all likelihood, more than a half of our data
set consists of error messages which were themselves generated erro-
neously, through incorrect routing. Obviously, router confusion dominates over
actual physical errors. These states of confusion could last substantially longer
than actual link or host downtimes, and perhaps even spread or self-organize in
some fashion. This may be an underlying cause of power-law organization in
the data. Let us also recall that a fundamental law of error correction circuitry
design is that the error correction components are just as fallible as the rest of
the circuit. Parity correction algorithms have to assume the error might very
well be in the parity bit, for instance. This fundamental notion has not been
implemented in communication protocols like RIP or ICMP: there is no ICMP
message reading ”I’m confused”.
As use of the Internet continues to spread, and as research and educational
institutions prepare for the Next Generation Internet and Internet2 projects, it
becomes more important to understand the global, large scale dynamics of our
world-wide network. We’ve shown that important clues to this dynamics may
lie in rather insignificant fractions of the overall traffic of the Net.
I would like to thank G. Cecchi, D. Chialvo, J.-P. Eckmann, M. Feigenbaum,
A. Libchaber and E. Siggia. This work was supported in part by the Sloan
Foundation.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Cumulative probability distributions G(∆t) of packet interarrival
times for four different traffic measurements: (a) 150000 packets of local traffic
at our cluster, (b) one million packets of local traffic at Bellcore (c) 150000
packets of external traffic at out cluster, (d) one million packets of external
traffic at Bellcore. Traces (a) and (c) were measured locally for this study;
traces (b) and (d) were studied in [6, 7, 8, 9] and are publicly available [18].
Figure 2: (a) Cumulative probability distribution G(∆t) and probability
density function P (∆t) for the interarrival times of ICMP error datagrams be-
tween our cluster and the outside of the Rockefeller campus. Notice that the
probability density follows P (∆t) ≈ 1/t for about 7 decades, except for sharp
Dirac-δ-like peaks. (b) Probability density for a two month trace over two sub-
nets.
Figure 3: Distribution of inter-event times in a simulation of network access
errors due to down links on a binary tree. The tree had 29 levels, so there were
229 leaf nodes and 229 − 2 routers and links. At any given time 100 links are
down; they stay down for an average of 105 iterations.
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